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Introduction and summary
The National Governors’ Association has projected
that state budgets will face an $80 billion deficit in
fiscal year (FY) 2004. This would represent almost
18 percent of total state spending. This comes on the
heels of a nearly $30 billion spending gap in FY2003.
This degree of budget insolvency in the state sector
is unique for two reasons. First, it follows a relatively
mild national recession that, by historical standards,
would not have been expected to send the states into
such budget turmoil. Second, it has affected virtually
every state, regardless of the type of revenue system
they use to support state government functions. The
persistent nature of these budget shortfalls has ex-
hausted the usual budget adjustments that states make
to pull themselves through tough times. Fund trans-
fers, drawing down reserves, and one-shot revenue
infusions were all used to balance state budgets in
FY2002 in the hopes that stronger economic growth
would restore fiscal health going forward.
In addition, states have been operating in a distinct-
ly “anti-tax” environment, in which proposals to in-
crease taxes to balance budgets have been met with
public and political opposition. Given this bleak situ-
ation, it is an appropriate time to examine the prospects
for a return to fiscal good health in the state and local
government sector, as well as the background to the
current instability. Some analysts have suggested that
beginning in the late 1990s, states began running
structural rather than cyclical deficits.1 In a structural
deficit, available revenues are simply inadequate to
maintain existing government services. Many of these
same analysts also suggest that states’ and localities’
existing revenue systems no longer support government
commitments. Gradual exemptions and distortions in
major tax bases have increased the volatility of tax
sources, while reducing the tax base. If this is the case,
managing state government through a boom and bust
cycle will require new models for state budgeting.
Policymakers need to restructure budget models to
reflect the service commitments of state government
and the productivity of the revenue structure.
In this article, I review the state and local budget sit-
uation. In particular, I look at conditions in the states that
comprise the Seventh Federal Reserve District (Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin). These states
have pursued different fiscal policies over the last decade
and have relied on different tax structures to pay for gov-
ernment, yet all are facing significant budget shortfalls.
This article suggests that budget problems during the
most recent period are indeed different from past expe-
rience. Structural factors seem to be playing a larger role
in fiscal stress. As illustrated by the behavior of the five
Seventh District states, the roots of fiscal stress vary
based on policy actions taken over the course of the last
decade. Putting state budgets on a sound footing will
require different strategies, depending on each state’s
choice of tax structure and expenditure commitments.
Long-run trends in state and local budgets
In this section, I examine broad trends in state
and local revenues and expenditures over a number
of economic cycles from 1960 to 2002.2 This period
includes recessions in 1975, 1980–81 and 1981–82,
1990–91, and 2001. The most current data for the com-
bined state and local sector is provided by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis in its National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA). However, the NIPA data
aggregates the sector into broad categories and cannot3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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be used to understand spending and reve-
nue trends in specific state and local ac-
tivities and programs, such as education
and welfare. In order to perform this
analysis, I use the U.S. Bureau of the
Census’ Government Finance Series;
however, this series is produced with a
two- to three-year lag, making it difficult
to analyze the most recent trends.
As figure 1 shows, the state and local
government sector has been growing,
measured as current expenditures relative
to gross domestic product (GDP). In 1960
state and local expenditures totaled $38.1
billion or roughly 7 percent of U.S GDP
of $527 billion. By 2001, state and local
expenditures had risen to almost $1.2
trillion or just under 12 percent of U.S.
GDP of $10 trillion. The sector’s expen-
ditures grew fastest during the 1960s.
Over the decade of the 1990s, the state
and local share of GDP drifted upward, starting at 11.4
percent in 1990 and ending at 11.8 percent in 2001.
Some of the recent growth of the state and local
sector may be explained by trends in fiscal federalism.
The federal government share of expenditures measured
as a share of GDP fell for much of the 1990s (see fig-
ure 1). Much of this can be attributed to declining de-
fense spending. In addition, the federal government
continued to transfer program responsibilities to the
states as part of a program of fiscal devolution. States
complained that this was the era of the unfunded fed-
eral mandate, as federal laws required
states to pay for more education, regula-
tion, and health care services.3 While this
is partially true, most of the increase in
state expenditures appears to be the result
of state participation in federal matching
programs such as Medicaid and other
transfer programs.4 Programs like welfare
and food stamps were added to state bud-
gets and, while these are primarily financed
by federal dollars, total state expenditures
from all welfare programs grew from 22.9
percent of state expenditures in 1978 to over
30 percent by the late 1990s.5 In addition,
states have taken greater responsibility in
funding education. After World War II,
states were responsible for financing one-
third of K–12 education. By 2000, the
state share had risen to about one-half.6
According to recent NIPA data, on a
current dollar basis, the sector wracked up
a record deficit of more than $50 billion in 2002 (see
figure 2). Adjusted to reflect constant dollars, the
deficit would still be five times the size of the 1991
deficit of roughly $10 billion. Measured as a percent-
age of expenditures, at nearly 4 percent the 2002 def-
icit ranks as the largest over the period 1960 to 2002
(see figure 3).
Examining the receipt and expenditure trends in
the state and local sector might shed some light on
how this deficit occurred. As figure 4 illustrates, the
annual percentage change in state and local receipts
FIGURE 2
State and local government surplus and deficit
$ billion
Note: Converted to constant dollars by state and local implicit price deflator.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product
Accounts, Government Current Receipts and Expenditures.
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FIGURE 3
State and local surplus and deficit,
percent of expenditures, NIPA basis
percent
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.







and expenditures has some notable highs and lows.
During the 1975 recession, state and local receipts fell
by 3.5 percent, while expenditures grew by only 1 per-
cent. From 1979 to 1983, real receipts fell for four con-
secutive years, with expenditures falling for three of
those years. In the latest cycle, growth in receipts peaked
in 1998 and had fallen to 1 percent in 2002 while ex-
penditure growth accelerated. The bulk of the recent
decline in receipts has been in the state sector—state
tax receipts fell more than 10 percent in the third quar-
ter of 2002.7
The current fiscal imbalance in the
sector begs the question whether the state
and local sector went on a spending binge
in the 1990s? As figure 4 demonstrates,
constant state and local expenditures grew
from 1993 to 2000 in a range of 1.4 per-
cent to 4.0 percent per year, which is not
extraordinary by historical standards. How-
ever, it is clear that expenditure increases
began to grow fastest just as receipts be-
gan to fall.
Real receipts in the sector demonstrated
a somewhat u-shaped pattern over the de-
cade of the 1990s. Receipt growth was
strong from 1990 to 1995, which partially
reflected the tax hikes put into effect follow-
ing the 1990–91 recession and then fell off
and stabilized in the 2 percent to 3 percent
range for the middle of the decade. Receipts
growth peaked in 1998 at 4.4 percent and
then declined to 3.5 percent in 1999, 1.7
percent in 2000, and 1.1 percent in 2001.
In 2002, receipts grew by a sluggish 2.3
percent (figure 4).
State and local budgets
in the 1990s
These broad trends in the state and local
sector tend to mask the structural changes
that were occurring. On the expenditure
side, states increased their spending on
education, health care, and public safety
functions, and all of these functions grew
to take a somewhat larger share of the state
and local budget pie. On the revenue side,
the personal income tax grew in its impor-
tance. In many states the personal income
tax supplanted the general sales tax as the
largest single tax source. Several states also
undertook tax reforms that increased their
reliance on state tax sources while lessen-
ing the local property tax burden. The de-
cade saw a great deal of reshuffling of state and local
responsibility and an increased expenditure emphasis
on specific programs.
Using the Bureau of the Census, State and Local
Government Finance series, it is possible to examine
the change in revenues for the sector by revenue
source. Revenues grew at significantly different rates
over this period. Comparing two years, state and lo-
cal revenues in 1990–91 versus 1999–2000,8 general
own source revenues for state and local governments
grew at a real rate of 25.9 percent. However, among
FIGURE 4
State and local receipts and expenditures
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Note: Converted to constant dollar by state and local implicit price deflator.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and
Product Accounts.
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TABLE 1




General own sources 25.9 2.59
Personal income tax 47.6 4.76
Sales tax 31.4 3.14
Corporate income tax 21.7 2.17
Property tax 11.4 1.14
Gross state product 34.0 3.40
Population growth 11.4 1.14
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years, State and
Local Government Finance Series, and author’s calculations.
the major tax bases, growth rates ranged from 47.6
percent for the personal income tax, to 31.4 percent
for the sales tax, 21.7 percent for the corporation in-
come tax, and 11.4 percent for the property tax. To
place these growth rates in perspective, real gross state
product grew by 34 percent over the same period (see
table 1). These different growth rates led to a slight
shift in the importance of each tax base, most notably
an increase in the share of tax revenue raised through
the personal income tax (from 21 percent to 24 per-
cent) and a decline in the property tax from 32 per-
cent to 28 percent (figure 5).
The differences in tax growth rates can be ex-
plained by several factors.9 Fox (2003) suggests three
structural issues have affected recent state tax perfor-
mance. The first issue is the relative inelasticity of most
tax sources. Tax elasticity and tax buoyancy measure
the response of a particular tax to growth or decline
in economic activity. Elastic or buoyant taxes tend to
grow faster during high growth periods than less elas-
tic taxes. Conversely, elastic or buoyant taxes tend to
decline more sharply during recessions. Estimates of
tax buoyancy10 by Bruce, Fox, and Tuttle (2002) show
that, on average, only the personal income tax (with
an estimated elasticity of 1.76) is an elastic tax base.
This elasticity contributed to the growth in personal
income tax receipts during the 1990s, particularly in
states with strong personal income gains. In contrast,
all other major tax bases are relatively inelastic. The
authors find that the elasticity of the sales tax is only
0.81. The corporate income tax elasticity was even
lower. Interstate corporate tax competition has made
it difficult for states to raise corporate taxes.
A second factor has been the narrowing of the
tax base. In the case of the sales tax, the base has been
eroded through mail order and e-commerce shopping,
technology changes, legislated exemptions, and changing
purchasing patterns. Technology changes that have
affected the tax base include the digitization of goods
such as books, software, and music. These are taxable
products when purchased in their physical format, but
they often go untaxed when downloaded by comput-
er. In terms of exemptions, the most popular is food
(30 states). Drugs are also frequently exempted, and
states also have special exemptions designed to spur
economic activity. Finally, consumption patterns con-
tinue to shift to favor services. In 1979 services rep-
resented 47.4 percent of consumption. By 2002, this
figure had risen to 58.8 percent.11 Given that no state
has yet implemented broad-based service taxation,
FIGURE 5
Share of state and local taxes by type
A. 1990–1991
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this shift in consumption patterns is eroding the
states’ tax base.
The corporate income tax has been eroding
through legislated exemptions, federal tax base
shrinkage, and tax planning and reduction strategies
by businesses and corporations. Fox and Luna (2002)
find that the effective corporate tax rate has fallen by
about one-third since the late 1980s even as the sim-
ple nominal rate has edged up slightly. Some of this
is due to the states’ own actions. One of the more com-
mon devices has been to adopt single (sales only)
factor apportionment formulas or other favorable
(double-weighted sales) apportionment factors for
determining tax liability. These devices are usually
proposed to support economic development by low-
ering the tax burden for firms located in the state with
significant out-of-state sales. This is in contrast to the
former three-factor formula that based tax liability on
property, payroll, and sales. The net effect is that sin-
gle sales factor and double-weighted sales formulas
narrow the tax base. Changes in the federal corporate
tax base have also been important. Virtually all states
use the federal definition for profits as a starting point
for calculating tax liability. Federal tax changes re-
garding depreciation and tax sheltering have reduced
taxable profits and, thus, the state corporate tax base.
Property tax growth was constrained during the
1990s for several reasons. First, many states and local-
ities adopted property tax limitation requirements that
limited the rate of tax increase. Second, several states
(Michigan and Wisconsin, for example) introduced
measures to reduce property tax burdens through tax
swaps, whereby certain state tax bases were raised in
conjunction with local property tax cuts and increased
state aid to localities, particularly in the form of pay-
ing for K–12 education.
On the expenditure side, education and social
service and income maintenance programs dominate.
Combined, these two areas consume 51 percent of all
direct state and local expenditures. As was the case
with revenues, some program areas (when measured
at 1990–91 levels versus 1999–2000 levels) grew at
faster rates during the 1990s, but the overall emphasis
on education and social services remained relatively
constant (see table 2). Using the Bureau of the Census,
State and Local Government Series, real direct expen-
diture growth was roughly 22 percent. The fastest
growing major program category was public safety,12
growing at 30.3 percent. Education13 grew at 29.5 per-
cent. Growth rates in the social service category varied.
While the public welfare component of this category
grew at 21.3 percent, the health component grew at
40.7 percent. The difference reflects policy changes
over the decade. Welfare reform reduced the welfare
rolls and helped contain costs. In the health sector,
Medicaid program expansions and health care inflation
led states to devote a greater share of their budget to
health programs (see table 2). In addition, the 1990–
91 recession increased expenditures for health and
welfare programs in that year, while strong economic
growth in 1999–2000 reduced expenditure pressures.
One area that did not grow particularly fast over this
period was state and local government salaries. Real
growth in salary expenditures was 15.4 percent.
Related literature
Several studies have examined whether the current
fiscal problems facing the states differ significantly
from the experience in previous economic cycles.
Knight, Kusko, and Rubin (2003)14 examined this ques-
tion using NIPA data by disaggregating the possible
causes of the deficit. The paper examines the relative
contributions of macroeconomic factors (the slowdown
in the economy), changes in capital gains realizations,
and changes in state policy, such as tax actions and
spending increases, to help explain what is driving the
deficit. The authors consider the slowdown in the econ-
omy and capital gains realizations to be largely outside
the state and local sector’s control, while policy changes
are within the sector’s control. A significant contribu-
tion of the study is that it contrasts the effect of these
factors with prior periods of fiscal stress (1978 to 1982,
1989 to 1991). To perform the analysis, the authors use
a high-employment budget framework to isolate the
effects of the business cycle on state and local budgets.15
This framework calculates the budget surplus or defi-
cit by adjusting tax receipts and outlays to the levels
they would attain if the economy were operating at its
potential (with potential defined as the highest level of
economic output that can persist without raising inflation).
“The bottom line of this analysis,” say Knight,
Kusko, and Rubin, “is that neither the cyclical
TABLE 2
State and local real revenue growth
by major program, 1990–91 versus 1999–2000
Average
Percent annual
Total direct expenditures 22.0 2.20
Public safety 30.3 3.03
Education 29.5 2.95
Public welfare 21.3 2.13
Health 40.7 4.07
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years, State and
Local Government Finance Series, and author’s calculations.7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
weakness in the economy, when measured relative to
its potential level, nor the direct effects of capital gains
realizations, when measured relative to their long-run
trend, account for very much of the deficit in 2002.
The implication is that the current deficit is largely
structural and thus unlikely to be eliminated in the
absence of significant budgetary actions by these
governments (italics added).”16 The authors find that
economic weakness was the primary contributor to
budgetary difficulties in the periods from 1978 to 1982
and 1989 to 1991. They suggest that the primary pol-
icy contributors to the 2002 deficit were state tax cuts
enacted during the 1990s and increases in Medicaid
expenditures.
Other analysts have pointed to a difference in tax
policy responses as aggravating state fiscal conditions
most recently. Maag and Merriman (2003)17 compare
state tax policy changes in response to the 1990 and
2001 recessions. The authors find that in the most re-
cent episode, major state tax revenues (income, gen-
eral sales) have performed quite sluggishly compared
with the 1990–91 recession. In the case of the income
tax, in 1990 revenues began to increase only one calen-
dar quarter later than GDP recovered and rose to pre-
recession level within five quarters. In 2001, state
revenues continued to fall even after GDP recovery
had been underway for four consecutive quarters.18
The authors suggest that it is this change in revenue
pattern that has been different in the most recent re-
cession. Possible reasons for this revenue decline in-
clude state income taxes becoming more volatile and
relying more on income from equity investments and
declines in the sales tax base associated with the
growth in Internet sales.
More importantly, the authors suggest that it has
been the states’ tax policy response that has delayed
revenue recovery. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
states enacted significant tax increases. According to
National Association of State Budget Officers data,
states made modest net increases to taxes even prior
to the 1991 recession. FY1988 through FY1990 saw
net tax increases of slightly less than $1 billion (in
FY1989) to $4 billion (in FY1990). However, it was
the sharp tax increases in 1991 and 1992 that were
notable. Net tax increases were $10.3 billion in 1991
and $14.2 billion in 1992. In addition, the largest in-
creases were across the major tax bases—personal in-
come and sales. In all, 16 states enacted personal income
tax increases in 1991 and 20 followed suit in 1992.
In contrast, the authors suggest that the tax poli-
cy reactions to the 2000 recession were smaller in
magnitude and different in character. Figure 6 illus-
trates the net revenue raised by each tax base (as a
percent of the previous year’s tax revenue) that could
be attributed to tax policy changes, such as increases,
in the rate or broadening of the base. Not only were
total net tax changes smaller in FY2002 and FY2003
than in FY1991 and FY1992, but the increases were
relatively restrained in the large tax bases of personal
income and sales. Tax increases were largest in tobacco
and business income. This slow revenue response has
been a feature of the most recent state fiscal problems
and may be contributing to the prolonged slump in
the sector after a relatively mild national recession.
Both of these studies lead to a similar conclusion
that much of the problems facing the sector this time
around are related to state policy actions. Both expen-
diture and revenue policies have created problems.
On the expenditure side, states (often prodded by
federal matching grants) have expanded Medicaid
services and eligibility. Similarly, they have increased
school spending in response to demands for higher
performance standards at both the state and federal
level. States have adopted stricter sentencing laws that
have increased prison costs. Recently, increased security
costs in response to the September 11th, 2001, terror-
ist attacks have pressured state spending. On the revenue
side, shifts in economic activity have narrowed tax
bases (shift from goods to service consumption), but
states have failed to take corrective action. This sug-
gests that the sector is facing a structural rather than
cyclical problem.
Economic determinants of state
and local budget cyclicality
To understand what policy prescriptions might
work best to balance the states’ books, we must first
understand the interplay between the factors that af-
fect how any state will respond to a slowdown in the
economy. These include the industrial structure of the
state’s economy, its mix of taxes and their relative
volatility, the breadth of the state’s tax base, and de-
mographics in the state that might influence what
services are required. For example, consider a hypo-
thetical state that has a relatively balanced tax struc-
ture (similar reliance on income and sales taxes), broad
tax bases, and a heavy reliance on manufacturing firms.
Given that the recent recession was led by the manu-
facturing sector, the resulting declines in the taxable
manufacturing wage base and manufacturing corporate
income may explain a significant portion of the state’s
budget deficit. If state policymakers believe that the
manufacturing downturn is cyclical, their policy response
might be to use one-shot budget measures to hold the
state together while waiting for a recovery in the manufac-
turing sector. On the other hand, if policymakers believe8 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 6
Fiscal year net tax policy change as a share of prior calendar year revenue in two recessions
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that the downturn in manufacturing is a structural phe-
nomenon, they may choose to alter the state’s tax and
expenditure policies to reflect a change in the level
of state economic activity.
Tax structure plays a significant role in the cycli-
cal response of a state to a downturn. On average, 34.5
percent of state taxes came from sales taxes and 37.4
percent from individual income in 2001.19 However,
this varies significantly from state to state. For exam-
ple five states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New
Hampshire, and Oregon) have no general state sales
tax. Seven states (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South
Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) have no
personal income tax. This reliance on a single major
tax base can create fiscal pressures if economic con-
ditions reduce either taxable consumption patterns or
personal income. In the case of two neighboring states—
Washington and Oregon—Washington raised nearly
64 percent of its state tax revenue through the sales
tax, while Oregon raised nearly 75 percent of its tax
revenue through the income tax. While both states have
faced deficits during the recent recession, Oregon’s
has been far worse as high unemployment has reduced
personal income, significantly reducing income tax
receipts. Washington has faced similar economic
conditions, but has seen the less elastic sales tax hold
up better over the cycle.20 Even states with both major
tax sources may rely more heavily on one base than
another. California receives almost 50 percent of its rev-
enue from income tax; the sales tax accounts for 27 per-
cent. In Mississippi, sales taxes raise 49 percent of tax
revenue, while income tax accounts for 22 percent.
Demographics are also important. States with
relatively larger populations of young and old face
special expenditure problems, related to K–12 educa-
tion and Medicaid, respectively.
Finally, states can try to cushion themselves against
cyclical pressures by instituting rainy day funds. These
are state savings programs designed to accumulate bal-
ances during good times with reserves being spent when
recessions occur. During the most recent recession, rainy
day balances peaked at 5.85 percent of expenditures
in 2000.21 When these funds were combined with other
state balances, states had reserves of slightly more
than 10 percent ($48.8 billion) of expenditures in 2000.
The funding of state rainy day programs tends to be
uneven, however, with the bulk of the balances being
carried in only four states. Further, if states are facing
structural deficits, rainy day funds are not designed
to address this type of fiscal pressure.9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 7
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Dealing with the problem
In FY2003 states tried to address the expenditure
side of the equation primarily by “spreading the pain.”
According to a survey by the National Conference of
State Legislatures,22 29 states opted for across the board
spending cuts by all agencies. Other significant targets
included higher education and Medicaid, with 13 states
opting to trim these budgets. In FY2004 it appears
that in addition to these areas, local revenue sharing
and K–12 education will be added to the list.
A particularly popular emerging strategy is to focus
on Medicaid and health care costs. A report from the
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured23
makes it clear why Medicaid will receive special at-
tention in state budgets. To begin with, it is important
to understand the scope of Medicaid’s role in the health
care system. Medicaid provides health insurance cov-
erage for 44 million Americans and one in five chil-
dren. It is the single largest source of federal grants
to states and pays for half of all nursing home care.
Roughly 15 percent of state general fund expenditures
are devoted to Medicaid.
Recently the rate of spending growth in Medicaid
expenditures (and in health care in general) has acceler-
ated. First, Medicaid spending responds to recession.
However as figure 7 demonstrates, average annual
spending growth rates began to accelerate after a pe-
riod of very slow growth in the middle of the 1990s.
This has paralleled the experience with general health
insurance premiums, which have also seen a rapid run-
up in costs in 2000 (8.3 percent) and 2001 (11 percent).24
Medicaid expenditure growth has been driven by in-
creasing drug costs, higher provider rates, expanded
enrollment, and increases in the number of long-term
care patients. Prescription drug costs have received
particular attention, as annual costs from 1998 to 2000
rose by 19.7 percent.25 Another key contributing fac-
tor has been the demographics of the Medicaid popu-
lation. While the growing elderly and disabled
population make up only 27 percent of Medicaid en-
rollees, they account for 67 percent of total expendi-
tures and accounted for 57 percent of the growth in
federal Medicaid expenditures in 2001–02 (figure 8).
In an effort to reign in spending increases, four
general strategies were applied by most states in
FY2003. These were:
■ Controlling pharmacy costs, including requiring
prior authorization before a prescription can be
written and filled, instituting preferred drug lists,
lowering payments for drug products, and institut-
ing or increasing patient co-pays;
■ Instituting payment cuts, freezes, or limited increases
for health care providers;
■ Restricting or cutting Medicaid program eligibility
and benefits; and
■ Cutting and freezing administrative budgets relat-
ed to Medicaid.
Many states are also seeking waivers for federal
rules for pharmacy and other programs in the hopes
that greater flexibility will make it easier to meet bud-
get challenges.
Ironically, one of the problems with cutting
Medicaid budgets is that it reduces the size of federal
Medicaid grants. This is particularly hard for states
whose federal Medicaid assistance percentage (FMAP)
is above the minimum level of 50 percent. Essential-
ly these states lose more than $1 in federal revenue
for every $1 reduction in state spending. In all, 25
states had FMAPs of greater than 60 percent in FY2002
(including the Seventh District states of Indiana and
Iowa). Ten states and the District of Columbia had
FMAPs of 70 percent or more. Of the other Seventh
district states, Illinois had the minimum FMAP of 50
percent and Michigan and Wisconsin had FMAPs of
between 51 percent and 60 percent.
States are clearly reluctant to make changes in the
major tax bases such as sales or income. This is in clear
contrast to tax increases passed in response to the
1990–91 recession.26 Instead “revenue enhancements”
have been concentrated in selective sales taxes, sin
taxes, or increases in licenses and fees. These have
been seen as more politically palatable. However, many
of these narrow taxes and fees lack the broad revenue
raising capacity to close the shortfalls facing the states.10 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
FIGURE 8
Medicaid enrollees and expenditures
by enrollment group, 1998
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aDisproportionate share hospital payments.

























Broad-based revenue strategies that appear popu-
lar include increased use of bonds to pay for projects
that previously may have been funded out of operating
expenses and securitizing proceeds from the tobacco
settlement awarded in 1999. The use of debt to carry
the states through the current doldrums has been popu-
lar because low interest rates have made refinancing
government debt and new debt issuance attractive.
However, states are reaching their debt limits and the
deteriorating fiscal conditions have landed 17 states
on the credit rating agency Moody’s “negative out-
look” list for a possible credit rating cut. Five states,
California, Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and North
Carolina have seen reductions in their credit rating
since the fall of 2002 and all of these states will face
higher borrowing costs as a result.27 Still, in the absence
of more sustained economic growth, it is unlikely
that these revenue remedies will be sufficient.
The state and local government sector
in the Seventh District
What has been the experience of the Seventh Dis-
trict states in the most recent economic cycle? Each
of the five states in the District has unique spending
and revenue patterns, which have influenced their re-
sponses to budget difficulties. One way to measure this
diversity relative to the national average is to examine
taxes and expenditures relative to personal income in
each state (see tables 3 and 4). As a percentage of in-
come, the combined state and local tax burden is the
lowest in Illinois (10.8 percent of personal income,
state rank of 33) and Indiana (10.6 percent of personal
income, state rank of 40), with both taxing at levels
below the U.S. average. In Iowa and Michigan, the tax
burden is roughly equal to the U.S. average at a little
over 11 percent of personal income. Only Wisconsin
can be characterized as being a high tax state relative
to the U.S. using this measure, with state and local
taxes equal to nearly 13 percent of personal income
and a state rank of 5. However, what is notable in the
Seventh District is the variance in the distribution be-
tween state and local tax sources. While Illinois has
the lowest state tax burden of the five states, its reliance
on the local property tax means that it has the highest
local tax burden of the group. Conversely, Michigan
has a high state tax burden that is balanced by a very
low local tax burden. In general, the table shows that
Seventh District states rely more on state tax sources
to raise revenue than on local sources.
On the expenditure side, both Iowa and Wisconsin
have relatively high combined state and local spending
levels, measured as a percentage of personal income
(table 4). While the U.S. average for state and local
combined general expenditures is 19.4 percent of per-
sonal income, Wisconsin’s expenditures ran at 21.5
percent of personal income and Iowa’s at 21.4 percent.
Illinois ranked 46th in the nation in this category with
expenditures at 17.2 percent of income. When it comes
to the distribution of spending between the state and
local governments, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin
have state expenditure levels as a percentage of income
above 14 percent (versus the U.S. average of 12.4),
Indiana is close to the national average, and Illinois is
significantly below that average at 9.9 percent. For local
expenditures, the range is tighter but Wisconsin and
Michigan earn a higher-than-average ranking for local
expenditures relative to personal income. Of course,
part of the explanation for this is that the use of a per-
sonal income measure benefits a relatively higher income
state like Illinois. As I discuss below, the states’ individual
revenue and expenditure policies, combined with eco-
nomic trends, underlie the fiscal problems in each state.
Illinois
Illinois’s fiscal problems are influenced by its
tax structure. The state raises similar shares of taxes
from both major bases, personal income and sales
(although it is slightly more dependent on the income
tax). From a structural tax base perspective, Illinois
would appear to be proportionately more reliant on
DSHa11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
the local property tax than is the case for most states.
For the nation as a whole, property taxes account for
roughly 28 percent of the total taxes raised by state and
local governments. In Illinois, property taxes in 2000
accounted for 36 percent of total state and local taxes.
Other states in the region have historically had rela-
tively high property taxes as well. However, Michigan
and Wisconsin made a policy choice in the 1990s to
reduce the local property tax burden and to provide
better equalization of local school funding by increasing
state taxes and lowering the property tax. Many states
throughout the nation took similar actions in response
to lawsuits aimed at reducing disparities in local school
funding.
Several commissions examining Illinois’s tax
structure have suggested a similar approach to improv-
ing the state’s finances. In 2002, the Education Fund-
ing Advisory Board recommended raising state income
and sales taxes by $5.3 billion to provide $3.5 billion
in property tax relief and $1.8 billion in additional
school funding. Implementing such a restructuring in
Illinois requires changes to the income tax. The state
constitution mandates that the state should have a flat
rate income tax. Given the low nominal rate (3 percent),
the income tax allows few exemptions for low-income
households and requires that a typical family of four
starts paying the tax at around $8,000 in income. This
makes Illinois’s income tax regressive relative to states
with graduated income tax structures. Without a con-
stitutional amendment to change the flat-tax require-
ment, increasing the flat rate would only aggravate
this situation. In addition, the constitution mandates
that the corporate income tax cannot have a rate great-
er than eight-fifths of the individual income tax rate.
This effectively means that the corporate income tax
rate of 4.8 percent cannot be increased independent-
ly. Corporate income tax collections are also affected
by the use of a single factor (sales-only) apportionment
formula for calculating state tax liability. This means
that the 4.8 percent tax rate is applied only to corpo-
rate income in proportion to in-state sales; multistate
corporations operating in the state but selling outside
the state pay no tax. Other factors, such as payroll
and property, are not considered.
Illinois’s system has another couple of notable
features. Most prominent is that all retirees’ pension
TABLE 4
State and local expenditures as percentage of personal income, FY2000
Per capita
State/local State State State Local Local personal income
expenditures rank expenditures rank expenditures rank (U.S. = 100)
Illinois 17.2 46 9.9 47 10.6 25 108.4
Indiana 18.6 35 12.4 30 10.5 26 91.9
Iowa 21.4 19 14.4 18 11.4 16 89.6
Michigan 19.8 26 14.1 22 12.0 12 100.2
Wisconsin 21.5 18 14.2 21 12.9 5 96.4
U.S. 19.4 12.4 11.3
Source: Rockefeller Institute, “State & local government gateway,” available at http//stateandlocalgateway.rockinst.org/fiscal_trends/
state_rankings/tables/ranktot39slg.
TABLE 3
State and local taxes as percentage of personal income, FY2000
Per capita
State/local State State State Local State personal income
taxes rank taxes rank taxes rank (U.S. = 100)
Illinois 10.8 33 6.1 43 4.7 10 108.4
Indiana 10.6 40 6.5 36 4.0 23 91.9
Iowa 11.1 23 7.1 25 3.9 27 89.6
Michigan 11.4 19 8.2 13 3.2 40 100.2
Wisconsin 12.9 5 8.7 7 4.2 20 96.8
U.S. 11.2 6.9 4.3
Source: Rockefeller Institute, “State & local government gateway,” available at http://stateandlocalgateway.rockinst.org/fiscal_trends/
state_rankings/tables/ranktot39slg.12 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
income is exempt from taxation regardless of the size
of the pension. In 2000 it was estimated that this cost
the state $500 million in income tax revenue.28 Further-
more, like Wisconsin and Michigan, Illinois receives
a low return from the federal government for its tax
dollars. Because of demographics, a lack of military
bases, and the state’s relatively high personal income,
Illinois received only 78 cents for every dollar that it
sent to Washington in FY2002.29 In terms of the sales
tax, the basic state rate is comparable to that of most
states but local rate add-ons can significantly boost
tax levels. Like most states, Illinois offers significant
exemptions in its sales tax and, so far, has failed to
capture the growing volume of sales in service-relat-
ed transactions.30
Illinois’s FY2004 budget deficit is estimated at
roughly $5 billion. Illinois’s recent revenue problems
have been blamed on a decline in personal income tax
revenues triggered by a sluggish economy. The Illinois
Office of Management and Budget has indicated that
although sales tax revenues remained relatively flat
from FY2001 to FY2003, personal income tax revenues
declined by $525 million in FY2001 (6.6 percent) and
$74 million in FY2002 (1 percent).31 Governor
Blagojevich maintained his pledge to avoid major tax
increases to bridge the gap; however, he raised selected
fees and business taxes. The state also floated debt to
meet its existing pension obligations. In addition, the
state implemented widespread expenditure cuts, as well
as a number of one-shot revenue enhancements. Illinois
did not make any structural changes in its major tax
bases. A final policy element that has hurt Illinois re-
cently has been the inability to build a significant rainy
day fund balance. By FY2002, the state was carrying
less than $230 million in its budget stabilization fund,
representing only 2 percent of state expenditures.
Indiana
Indiana has enacted sweeping tax reform on the
heels of an Indiana Supreme Court decision in 1998
that struck down the state’s previous property assess-
ment system.32 Essentially, the court found that over
time property assessments bore little relationship to
actual property values. To adjust for this would require
statewide reassessments based on market values that
were expected to increase property tax levies by 33
percent but, more importantly, would result in a sharp
reshuffling in tax burdens. Business property taxes
would also increase, raising concern about the state’s
economic development prospects. This response was
seen as politically unpalatable.
Instead, a tax study committee headed by the lieu-
tenant governor recommended that the state shift school
funding from local to state sources, eliminate the in-
ventory and gross receipts tax, increase the sales tax
rate, and move to a graduated personal income tax.
This would permit the state to offer significant property
tax relief, while maintaining government programs.
The plan that passed the legislature has the state
assuming 60 percent of the current property tax burden
(primarily by paying a larger share of K–12 education),
allowing for a 12.8 percent decrease in property tax
payments and doubling the value of the homestead
exemption on residential property (from 10 percent
to 20 percent) to establish a more progressive property
tax structure. The plan is designed to raise $1.5 billion
in state revenues, with $1 billion earmarked for prop-
erty tax relief.33
Indiana also altered its business tax structure. The
state eliminated the gross receipts tax and will phase
out the inventory tax by 2007. To compensate for the
lost revenue, Indiana raised the corporate income tax
rate from 7.75 percent to 8.5 percent. In addition, it
doubled the research and development tax credit to
10 percent.
Other changes to replace revenue lost from prop-
erty tax reductions and business cuts included raising
the cigarette tax from 40 cents to 55 cents, raising the
sales tax from 5 percent to 6 percent, and some adjust-
ments to gambling taxes. The state legislature rejected
a recommendation to introduce a graduated personal
income tax. However, it did make the personal income
tax more progressive by adopting the earned income
tax credit. In all, the tax restructuring increased avail-
able state revenues by about $500 million.
Despite these reforms, Indiana’s fiscal situation
remains strained. Revenue growth continues to dis-
appoint as the state’s economy has been dispropor-
tionately affected by the recent recession. As the most
manufacturing-dependent state in the nation, Indiana
has been particularly slow to recover. Indiana has ben-
efited from the large fund balances it built up during
the late 1990s and early 2000. The state’s rainy day
fund plus its general fund balances exceeded 20 per-
cent of state expenditures in 1997 through 1999. It has
needed to draw on these balances in recent years and,
by 2002, they were under 4 percent of expenditures.
Iowa
Iowa has one of the more balanced tax structures
in the District, with roughly equal shares of revenue
being raised from sales, income, and property levies.
Like most states, Iowa offers an array of sales and
business tax exemptions, and it is estimated this costs
the state $1.2 million in lost revenue.34 Popular exemp-
tions include farm machinery and agricultural feed.13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
While some have suggested that reducing the number
of sales tax exemptions might help solve some of the
state’s budget problems, the state has found it difficult
to identify any obvious exemptions to target. In addi-
tion, Iowa has developed two rainy day funds (the cash
reserve fund and the economic emergency fund) to help
smooth its performance during economic downturns.
The state has carried significant general fund balanc-
es, reaching 20 percent of expenditures in 1997 and
1998 and exceeding 10 percent in 2000. By 2002,
fund balances had fallen to 5 percent of expenditures.
One obvious target for reform is the state’s per-
sonal income tax. The source of greatest fiscal pres-
sure has been an unanticipated decline in capital gains
tax revenues. Iowa became more reliant on capital
gains revenues after 1998, when a tax reform package
cut the personal income tax by 10 percent and reduced
inheritance taxes. This is estimated to have cost the
state $450 million in revenues.35 Iowa’s personal in-
come tax is relatively complicated, with a significant
number of deductions, credits, and exemptions. And at
75 lines, even the tax form in Iowa is significantly
longer than in most states. Iowa has also reduced the
yield from its income tax by an estimated $600 mil-
lion by allowing taxpayers to deduct taxes paid to the
federal government. While lawmakers have proposed
eliminating or reducing this deduction, it is unclear
whether this will meet with much support.
Michigan
Michigan dramatically overhauled its tax struc-
ture during the 1990s, largely to meet K–12 educa-
tion financing needs. The 1994 tax reform raised the
state’s sales tax (from 4 percent to 6 percent) while
lowering property taxes and established a guaranteed
minimum per-pupil funding level for all school dis-
tricts. The shift meant the state was now responsible
for roughly 78 percent of school funding compared
with just 29 percent prior to the change.
Michigan’s state budget is primarily composed
of two major funds—the general fund and the school
aid fund. The general fund supports most state opera-
tions other than K–12 education and is supported by
the state business tax and the personal income tax
(revenues from both of these sources have declined
in recent years). In FY2004, general fund revenues
fell to $7.78 billion, equaling the available revenues
in FY1993. In contrast, the school aid fund is supported
by a mix of revenue sources, including property and
sales taxes and gaming revenues. This revenue mix
has proven more stable and has allowed for steady or
slightly improving performance in the school aid fund.
Michigan aggressively cut taxes during the 1990s.
The state made an estimated $32 billion in cumulative
tax cuts during the decade, including repeal of the
intangibles tax on dividends and interest, increased
personal income tax exemptions, increased deductions
for children, new tax breaks for seniors, phase-out of
the inheritance tax, and a five-year decline in income
tax rates.36 The state also added adjustments and ex-
emptions, which had the effect of narrowing the sales
tax base.
Michigan has a unique tax feature, the single busi-
ness tax. Designed to behave much like a value-added
tax, this business tax was popular with government
finance experts. The tax was also a significant revenue
raiser, accounting for 9.4 percent of total state tax
collections in 2001 and providing nearly one-quarter
($2.2 billion) of the revenue in the general fund budget.
However, the tax was very unpopular with the state’s
business community, particularly small businesses. In
response, in 1998 the legislature enacted a phase-out
of the tax over a 20-year period. The legislature stip-
ulated that the phase-out would be suspended if the
state’s rainy day fund fell below $250 million, and,
indeed, it was suspended in 2002. In exchange for the
suspension, legislators agreed to accelerate the time-
table; the tax is now due to be phased out by 2010.
Michigan had built up its budget stabilization fund
to 16 percent of expenditures by 2000, but subsequently
drew down these balances to 4 percent (as of 2002).37
The state’s aggressive tax cutting in the 1990s has
affected its ability to maintain its commitment to pay-
ing for local government. The state has agreed to take
on a larger role in funding local government and edu-
cation, but has whittled down its tax base to a point
where revenue sharing is in jeopardy. Yet, local govern-
ment has only limited ability to raise revenue. The
state has placed limits on local property taxes and
prohibits cities and counties from levying an income
tax. Even local option sales and hotel occupancy tax-
es are highly restricted in Michigan, and all local tax
changes must be approved by the state legislature.
Michigan’s revenues have clearly been hurt by
the economic slowdown, but estimates suggest that
70 percent of the estimated $1.8 billion decline in
general fund revenues can be attributed to policy ac-
tions that reduced the single business tax and the per-
sonal income tax.38 On the expenditure side, the
FY2004 budget cut spending for higher education by
10 percent and reduced aid to local governments by
3 percent. The state managed to maintain K–12 edu-
cation spending at the existing level.3914 1Q/2004, Economic Perspectives
Wisconsin
Wisconsin has created a different kind of fiscal
pressure on its government. On the spending side, it
followed a similar path as Michigan by shifting greater
responsibility for funding K–12 education to the state.
In 1993, the legislature imposed revenue caps on school
districts. Much of this was in response to Wisconsin’s
having the second fastest property tax growth in the
nation in the 1980s. To balance the local caps, the
legislature also mandated that the state would pay two-
thirds of the cost of K–12 education. It was anticipated
that the larger state role and the revenue caps would
decrease local property taxes by nearly 40 percent.40
From all appearances, Wisconsin’s problems de-
rive from a tax system that simply fails to produce
enough revenue to fund the level of services the state
has chosen to provide. The tax structure is remarkably
balanced and does not suffer from obvious structural
failings. The state has created a joint legislative com-
mittee on tax exemptions that has limited the prolif-
eration of tax exemptions found in most states. Even
in the case of the income tax, Wisconsin has been less
affected than other states by the recent decline in per-
sonal income tax receipts, because it had already ex-
empted 60 percent of volatile capital gains income
from its tax base.
Wisconsin would also seem to have fewer avail-
able revenue options for solving its fiscal problems.
For 30 years the state has been in the top ten for most
measures of tax burden. Higher taxes would be hard
for lawmakers to support and possibly detrimental to
economic activity. The state failed to build a rainy day
fund in the 1990s, and its budget practice of carrying
forward budget balances from the first to the second
year of the biennium has helped mask the actual con-
dition of its budget. Wisconsin was among the first states
to securitize its tobacco settlement fund revenues in
order to have immediate access to those revenues. The
state received a payment of $1.3 billion for a settlement
that was valued at $5.9 billion over 25 years.
A special commission in 2001 examined the state’s
budget situation and concluded that while the state
needed to trim its taste for spending, solving the state’s
budget problems on the expenditure side only would
hurt its economic growth.41 The panel suggested in-
creasing the state sales tax rate from 5 percent to 6
percent and adding professional and business services
to the sales tax base.
In designing the FY2004 budget, Wisconsin cut
local revenue sharing by $50 million, as well as cut-
ting funding to state agencies by 10 percent or $400
million. In all, 2,300 state jobs will be eliminated.
Despite these cuts, the state will fall short of its commit-
ment to pay for two-thirds of K–12 education spending.42
Conclusion
States have always faced periodic budget crises
and yet have managed to muddle through. However,
the current financial decline appears to be driven by
structural factors in both revenues and expenditures.
Short-term fixes and incremental changes to make
ends meet have failed to return states to fiscal solvency.
When choosing a strategy for correcting an imbalance
in state and local finances, it is important to examine
the structural and cyclical differences that exist be-
tween states. Structural issues such as choice and breadth
of tax base, structure of the local economy, and demo-
graphics all affect state budgets differently. Cyclical
issues, such as where a recession’s impact is concen-
trated, must also be considered. While broad trends
in funding programs such as Medicaid, education, and
prisons have been affecting all states, each state’s fis-
cal response needs to take into account the tax policy
and expenditure choices that the state has embraced.
For some states, expenditure reductions will be more
appropriate and, for others, changes to the basic tax
structure may work best.15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1See Tannenwald (2001) and Orszag (2003).
2Because of the heterogeneity in spending between state and local
governments across the 50 states, using combined state and local
revenue and expenditure data is appropriate. In some states such
as Hawaii, the state government is responsible for almost 80 per-
cent of the expenditures for the state and local government sector.
In contrast, Florida favors a more decentralized approach with
the state and local sectors being responsible for roughly equal
shares of total expenditures. The determining factor is usually
how K–12 education is paid for.
3In a study conducted under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that over the period
1996–2000, only 9 percent (32) of the bills with intergovernmen-
tal mandates imposed annual costs on state or local government
of $50 million or more. See U.S. CBO (2001). State organizations
have countered that in 2003, federal unfunded mandates for special
education, the No Child Left Behind Act, election reform, and
homeland security ranged from $23.5 billion to $82.5 billion.





8The use of two data points has some weaknesses. First, 1990–91
was a recession year. Clearly, personal income tax receipts would
have been affected by the downturn and this may overstate the
degree of change compared with 1999–2000 when the economy
was in expansion. The sales and property taxes tend to be less re-
sponsive to the business cycle and, therefore, would be less af-
fected by the choice of 1990–91 as the base for comparison.
9Fox (2003).
10Tax buoyancy measures the percent change in revenue divided
by the percent change in the base. Unlike tax elasticity estimates,
these measures don’t exclude changes in tax rates and bases over
time. These estimates were constructed over the most recent busi-
ness cycle from peak to peak using 1998 to 2000 and from trough
to trough using 1991 to 2002.
11Fox (2003), p. 12.
12Public safety includes police, fire, and corrections. Of these
three components, corrections grew the fastest at 36.5 percent.
13Education includes higher education, K–12 education,
and capital outlays.
14Knight, Kusko, and Rubin (2003).
15See Kusko and Rubin (1993), pp. 411–423.
16Knight et al. (2003), p. 8.
17Maag and Merriman (2003).
18Ibid., p. 4.
19U.S. Census Bureau (2002b).
20For example, on a year-over-year basis in 2002, sales tax receipts
fell 1 percent in the first quarter, and grew by 1.5 percent, 3.8
percent, and .7 percent, respectively, in quarters two through four.
In contrast, personal income tax revenues fell by 14.3 percent in
the first quarter and continued to fall by 22.3 percent, 1.6 percent,
and .7 percent, respectively, in quarters two through four. See
Rockefeller Institute (2002), revenue report database.
21National Governors Association and the National Association of
State Budget Officers (2002), p. 15.
22National Conference of State Legislatures (2003b).
23Holahan, Weiner, Bovbjerg, Ormond, and Zuckerman (2003).
24Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of state data from HIAA,
KFF/HRET, and BLS in 2001.
25Growth rate represents changes in total fee-for-service expendi-
tures for the types of service. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid
and the Uninsured/Urban Institute Analysis of HCFA-64 data.
26See Magg and Merriman (2003).
27Wiggins (2003), p. 15.
28Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2001).
29See Northeast Midwest Institute (2003).
30Barrett et al. (2003), p. 52.
31Illinois Office of Management and Budget (2003), p. 26.
32Town of St. Johns vs. Indiana Board of Tax Commissioners,
Indiana Supreme Court, December 4, 1998.
33Barrett et al. (2003), p. 54.
34Ibid.
35Council of State Governments (2003), p. 9.
36Barrett et al. (2003), p. 62.
37Council of State Governments (2003), p. 13.
38Ibid.
39Anderson (2003), p. 4.
40Sheffrin (1998), p. 133–134.
41State of Wisconsin (2001).
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